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Abstract: 
Exposure to parasites in conservation translocations increases the risks to recipient and 
translocated populations from disease, and therefore there has been interest in implementing 
biosecurity methods.     Using four case examples we described how biosecurity was applied 
in practical translocation scenarios prior to and during a translocation and also post-release. 
We implemented biosecurity, including quarantine barriers, at specific points in the 
translocation pathway where hazards, identified by the disease risk analysis, had the potential 
to induce disease.   Evidence that biosecurity protected translocated and recipient 
populations, included an absence of mortality associated with high risk non-native parasites, 
a reduction in mortality associated with endemic parasites, the absence of high risk 
pathogenic parasites, or associated diseases, at the destination; and the apparent absence of 
diseases in closely related species at the destination site.   The biosecurity protocols did not 
alter the level or duration of translocated species confinement and therefore probably did not 
act as a stressor. There is a monetary cost involved in biosecurity but the epidemiological 
evidence suggests that conservation translocation managers should carefully consider its 
use. Breakdowns in quarantine have occurred in human hospitals despite considerable 
investment and training for health professionals, and we therefore judge that there is a need 
for training in the objectives and maintenance of quarantine barriers in conservation 
translocations. Biosecurity protocols for conservation translocations should be continually 
updated in response to findings from disease risk analysis and post-release disease 
surveillance and we recommend further studies to evaluate their effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
Conservation translocations, defined as the intentional movement and release of a living 
organism where the primary objective is improving the conservation status of the target 
species, and/or to restore natural ecosystem functions or processes (IUCN 2013), are known 
to increase the risks to recipient and translocated populations from disease because of the 
increased probability of contact between hosts and novel parasites (Davidson and Nettles, 
1992), stressor effects on animals as a result of the move to a new environment (Dickens et 
al., 2010) and exposure to parasites or non-infectious disease agents during transit or in the 
destination environment (Kock et al., 2010).  When novel parasite – host interactions occur as 
a consequence of translocation the impact on populations can be severe, as illustrated by the 
squirrelpox viral disease outbreak in the UK (Sainsbury et al., 2008).  Free-living wild animals 
are known to have been exposed to novel parasites  as a consequence of conservation 
translocations, for example Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis was introduced into the free-living 
Mallorcan midwife toad (Alytes muletensis) population with animals from a captive-breeding 
facility where there were no quarantine barriers between species from different geographical 
locations (Walker et al., 2008).  Likewise stressor associated infectious disease in 
conservation translocations has led to severe disease outbreaks, for example with cirl 
buntings (Emberiza cirlus) (McGill et al., 2010).  
 
Given that a component of the increased risk from disease in translocations stems from 
exposure to parasites (defined as viruses, bacteria, fungi, protozoa, helminths and 
ectoparasites) there has been considerable interest in setting up biosecurity protocols when 
undertaking translocations (Kirkwood and Sainsbury, 1997; Kock et al., 2010; Woodford and 
Kock, 1991) but the details of specific protocols have not been published.   Ballou (1993) 
noted the importance of quarantine prior to reintroduction to reduce the risk from disease and 
advocated the removal of animals from planned reintroduction if quarantine facilities were 
absent.  Woodford (2000) described the principles of quarantine and screening protocols prior 
to translocation, and set out recommended screening tests and methods for different taxa, but 
did not specifically explain how a quarantine barrier should be set up to achieve the aims.  
 
In this paper we describe four cases where biosecurity has been set up by the Disease Risk 
Analysis and Health Surveillance Project (DRAHS), a collaboration between the Zoological 
Society of London and Natural England, for the purpose of reducing the risk from disease in 
translocation for conservation purposes.   The four cases were translocations of the cirl 
bunting (Emberiza cirlus), Fisher's estuarine moth (Gortyna borelii lunata), short-haired 
bumblebee (Bombus subterraneus), and pool frog (Pelophylax lessonae) and they illustrate 
how the principles of biosecurity can be applied in practical translocation scenarios, not only 
prior to translocation but also during a translocation and post-release. For most translocations 
considered by DRAHS a disease risk analysis (DRA) has been undertaken (Sainsbury and 
Vaughan-Higgins, 2012), followed by the writing of a disease risk management and post-
release surveillance protocol (DRM PRHS) in which detailed biosecurity recommendations 
are made.  This protocol is then used to monitor the effects of translocation on translocated 
and sympatric species at the destination. Disease risk management (DRM) of hazards 
identified in the DRA potentially includes: (i) biosecurity including quarantine, (ii) preventive 
medication  (iii) screening for parasites (iv) vaccination, and (v) therapeutic elimination of 
parasites but in this paper we describe only biosecurity, through quarantine, measures in 
detail. 
 
Here we define biosecurity as the implementation of management methods to reduce the 
probability of negative effects on ecosystems from biological organisms (including parasites) 
which break ecological or geographical barriers and build up in the environment of 
translocated animals. The purpose of biosecurity in translocations monitored by DRAHS has 
been to reduce the risk from disease from parasites and we have targeted it at hazards, of 
several different categories (source, destination, carrier, transport and population; Sainsbury 
and Vaughan-Higgins 2012), at the location in the translocation pathway at which they act.  
Using the hazard identification system proposed by Sainsbury and Vaughan-Higgins, (2012) 
we have systematically identified the points in the translocation pathway at which biosecurity 
was assessed as paramount to prevent (i) transfer of parasites across barriers and (ii) build-
up of parasites in the environment during the translocation. Building on the OIE (2010) 
definition, we define quarantine as an area where wild animals are maintained in isolation, 
through the use of a barrier, with no direct or indirect contact with animals on the other side of 
the barrier, to reduce the likelihood of transmission of parasites across the barrier while the 
animals are undergoing observation and, if appropriate, screening, testing and / or treatment 
prior to, during or after translocation.  
 
Case histories 
The cirl bunting is rare and range restricted in England, and bred only in south Devon until a 
reintroduction , as defined by IUCN (2013), to Cornwall was carried out between 2006 and 
2011.  The reintroduction pathway involved the annual capture of 75-80 free-living cirl bunting 
chicks from the remnant Devon population and captive-rearing for reintroduction as fledglings 
into Cornwall, England (Figure 1).  A DRA, undertaken prior to the first translocation, 
predicted that the greatest risk from disease to the project stemmed from the plan to rear the 
buntings from six day-old chicks to approximately 35 day old fledglings in a zoological 
collection.  The DRA advised that the captive rearing facility should be sited distant from the 
zoological collection to reduce the risk of disease from four groups of non-native (alien) 
parasites (source hazards: namely poxviruses, Borrelia spp, Mycoplasma spp and Chlamydia 
spp) potentially present in the zoo and, as a result, a new captive-rearing facility was set up at 
a remote location close to the destination reintroduction site behind a quarantine barrier 
(McGill et al., 2005;  Fountain et al. 2016). Aviculture staff were managed by the zoo but 
based at the remote location.   All fieldworkers, avicultural, and veterinary staff in contact with 
cirl buntings were dedicated to the programme and did not handle non-native bird species or 
visit zoos or other non-native bird collections, to reduce the possibility of non-native 
pathogens infecting cirl buntings.   
 
Further disease risk management measures included maintaining a quarantine barrier at all 
stages of transport and rearing because the buntings were held in close proximity to each 
other (a maximum of 40 buntings were present in the rearing facility at one time) and 
therefore a build-up in parasites in the environment was predicted (McGill et al 2006) and a 
concomitant disease outbreak had occurred in a trial reintroduction  (McGill et al 2010).  
Since translocation acts as a stressor on animals leading to immunosuppression (Dickens et 
al., 2010), a build up in parasites in the cirl bunting’s environment was believed to have 
precipitated disease in the trial reintroduction.  For example, all transport vehicles used to 
collect chicks from Devon and transport them to Cornwall were clean and not previously used 
for the transport of birds.  Chicks were transported in disposable cardboard or polystyrene 
boxes which were discarded after single use.  In the rearing facility, each brooder, canary 
cage, and pre-release aviary was an individually quarantined rearing unit, for example each 
brooder was placed on a separate table with its own labeled equipment and tools. Staff 
washed their hands in F10 disinfectant and changed into dedicated clothing (aprons) for each 
quarantined rearing unit.  A change of boots and use of a disinfectant foot dip was mandatory 
on entry and exit of the brooder facility, the canary cage facility, and for each individual pre-
release aviary.  All working surfaces were cleaned daily with F10 disinfectant.  All waste at 
every stage of rearing was kept separate and disposed of using clinical waste protocols.   
 
To minimize the likelihood of zoonotic infection, for example from Campylobacter spp, bird-
dedicated areas were in quarantine from the human inhabited part of the captive-rearing 
facility: the barriers provided clear separation.  The biosecurity protocols were communicated 
through a DRM protocol document, with hard copies distributed and discussions held 
annually at a pre-season meeting in conjunction with a site visit and updated 
recommendations from previous years explained.  Analysis of reintroduction success reported 
no detected mortality associated with non-native infectious agents (Fountain et al., 2016) 
which the biosecurity was designed to prevent.  Cirl bunting mortality was associated with a 
wide variety of infectious agents, causing disease secondary to apparent 
immunosuppression, e.g. Isospora spp (McGill et al., 2010), and Campylobacter spp already 
harboured by the birds (native parasites and carrier hazards).  The pre-release mortality rate 
was highest in 2007 (42.5%; n = 26/73;  Fountain et al., 2016) and as a consequence  
quarantine and hygiene guidelines and their execution were reassessed and made more 
stringent  where it was judged appropriate by veterinarians with expertise in wild animal 
management (Molenaar and Sainsbury 2008) and in the four subsequent years of rearing the 
mortality rate was markedly reduced (19.5%; n = 50/257) (Fountain et al., 2016). 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
A similar biosecurity protocol (including quarantine barrier) was established when Fisher’s 
estuarine moths (Gortyna borelii lunata) were captive bred for reinforcement, as defined by 
IUCN (2013).  The Fisher’s estuarine moth is a rare and highly threatened species, and 
captive breeding for release commenced to minimise the need for translocation from the 
small and vulnerable wild population in the north-east of Essex and in Kent, England. The 
dedicated captive breeding facility was sited at the perimeter of a zoological collection which 
housed non-native species of invertebrates (including some Lepidoptera) (Figure 2).   
Quarantine of the captive breeding facility was implemented to prevent infection of the moths 
with potentially non-native parasites harboured by the invertebrates in the zoological 
collection and transfer of these parasites to the wild.  Quarantine included a disinfectant 
footbath, dedicated boots and clothing, the wearing of disposable gloves, and the use of 
dedicated tools.  Staff caring for the moths had no contact with non-native invertebrates in the 
zoo and serviced the moths on arrival each day prior to servicing the zoo collection.  Signage 
was added to denote and explain the quarantine barrier.  There has been no known mortality 
associated with non-native infectious agents detected to date. 
 
 (Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
In 2012 the reintroduction (IUCN 2013) of the short-haired bumblebee (Bombus 
subterraneus) from the source environment, Sweden, to the destination environment 
Dungeness in England commenced (Figure 3).  Habitat loss and subsequent resource 
depletion were the primary factors implicated in the loss of the species in the UK. 
Approximately one hundred queens were wild caught in April/May each year between 2012 
and 2015 and transferred to a University facility in England to allow for screening of 
potentially non-native parasites prior to transit to the destination site.  Biosecurity was 
implemented through quarantine to (i)  prevent escape of any non-native parasites into 
England before and during screening because three medium risk and nine low risk source 
hazards were identified in the DRA, (ii) to assist in the detection of an unknown source hazard 
TRANSPORT TRANSPORT 
which might cause disease in the bumblebees before release and (iii) to protect the 
bumblebees, and destination ecosystem, from parasites harboured by non-native 
invertebrates housed in the University.  Quarantine measures included the disinfection of all 
equipment, clothing, boots and vehicle internal surfaces prior to departure from Sweden to 
the UK; disinfection of all equipment, clothing and surfaces in contact with bees after arrival in 
England; eliminating contact between staff servicing the bumblebees in England and non-
native invertebrates two weeks prior to, and during, quarantine destruction of all materials in 
contact with the bumblebees on arrival in England; a barrier surrounding the University 
enclosure of bumblebees which dedicated staff crossed only if wearing boots, gloves and 
overalls and through a disinfectant footbath;  use of dedicated labelled tools in quarantine; a 
locked quarantine door with appropriate signage; disposal of quarantine waste by 
incineration; a sealed door to prevent ingress of insects;  a strip of insect trap tape (chemical- 
and attractant-free) placed around the internal aspect of the door and; disinfection of all 
surfaces, enclosures and tools at the end of quarantine, and any remaining food incinerated.    
.    Bumblebees which harboured four potentially non-native parasites, Apicystis bombi, 
Crithidia bombi , Nosema bombi and and Sphaerularia bombi, were sacrificed during 
quarantine (see Brown et al., 2016) and there is no evidence that these parasites have been 
introduced to England.  No disease attributable to known and unknown source hazards or 
non-native parasites has been detected.   
 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
 
Pool frogs (Pelophylax lessonae) reintroduced (IUCN 2013) to England from Sweden 
between 2005 and 2008, were moved directly to the destination from the airport and were 
released immediately (screening of source and destination populations had been carried out 
prior to reintroduction and informed the DRA) (McGill et al., 2004) (Figure 4).  Quarantine 
during transport included the use of dedicated, clean tools and enclosures, not previously 
used for animal transport.   A quarantine barrier was implemented in the field at the 
destination site to (i) prevent or reduce the probability of exposure of the pool frogs to 
parasites (destination hazards) in England analysed as representing a high disease risk 
namely ranaviruses and Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis  and (ii) reduce the rate of spread 
from the release site of any unknown non-native parasites harboured by the pool frogs and / 
or to assist in the detection of disease associated with these non-native parasites by 
temporarily confining the released pool frogs.   The release ponds were surrounded by an 
amphibian-proof fence 0.5m high which remained in place for the first year of the project.  
There was controlled vehicular entry to the site and staff wore dedicated boots, overalls and 
gloves (which had not been used to study amphibians at other sites).   All tools, including 
veterinary equipment, and nets were new or disinfected and not used for any other species 
and stayed on site in a lockable box where possible.  Any equipment or materials leaving the 
site was disinfected to reduce the probability that novel infectious agents introduced with pool 
frogs would spread. Clinical waste, including gloves, was incinerated.   Post release health 
surveillance on pool frogs and native amphibians (common frogs (Rana temporaria), common 
toads (Bufo bufo), great crested newts (Triturus cristatus) and smooth newts (Lissotriton 
vulgaris) was undertaken between 2006 to 2012.  No cases of infection with ranaviruses or 
with Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, both of which are widespread in England (Teacher et 
al., 2010; Smith, 2014), or disease associated with these agents, has been detected in pool 
frogs or native amphibians on site, and no diseases associated with non-native infectious 
agents, introduced with pool frogs, have been detected.  The mean and range, in brackets, of 
pool frogs and native amphibians examined per annum between 2006 and 2012 was: mean 
24 (range 1-55) pool frogs; mean 25 (range 0 -62) smooth newts; 23 (0-42) great crested 
newts; 9 (1-20) common frogs; 31 (29-34) common toads. Therefore the results of post-
release health surveillance and screening provided no evidence that the quarantine barrier 
had been broken during this post-release period. 
 
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
 
Discussion 
Here we have shown through examining four real conservation translocation cases  how we 
have used targeted implementation  of  biosecurity to reduce the risk from disease  at the 
points in the translocation pathway where specific hazards (source, carrier, destination, 
population and transport), identified by the disease risk analysis, had the potential to induce 
disease.   While in the cirl bunting, short-haired bumblebee and Fisher’s estuarine moth 
examples the major objective was to prevent the introduction of non-native infectious agents 
(source hazards) to the destination environment (from either zoological collections or natural 
source sites), the primary purpose in the pool frog translocation was to prevent contact with 
population hazards (ranaviruses and Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis) which could have an 
effect on population size at the destination. Other biosecurity objectives included (i) to reduce 
the potential for build-up of parasites in the environment of stressed animals at high density 
(cirl buntings), (ii) to minimize the likelihood of zoonotic infection (cirl buntings), (iii) to detect 
an unknown source hazard before release (bumblebees) or after release (pool frogs) , (iv) to 
reduce the rate of spread from the release site of any unknown non-native parasites 
harboured by the translocated animal and / or to detect disease associated with these non-
native parasites (pool frogs) and (vi) to prevent contact with non-native infectious agents 
present in the translocation pathway (bumblebees and pool frogs). 
 
The hazard categories described in the disease risk analysis, using the method described by 
Sainsbury and Vaughan-Higgins (2012), can be used to determine the best location for 
quarantine barriers to prevent the spread of parasite hazards to susceptible populations 
(either translocated animals or recipient populations).  In the cirl bunting example, the DRA 
explained that source hazards (infectious agents in non-native birds in the zoological 
collection) represented the highest risk from disease to the translocation and therefore the 
rearing location was moved from the zoo to the release location to create a quarantine barrier 
between the zoo and reintroduction site.   No diseases attributable to source hazards were 
detected in the cirl buntings and therefore the transfer of the cirl buntings to a new location 
was apparently successful in preventing disease.  In the bumblebee reintroduction, a barrier 
was set up to prevent release of source hazards from quarantine and to reduce the probability 
of contact with non-native invertebrates and their potential source hazards.  Bumblebees 
were sacrificed to prevent release of source hazards and since the epidemiological sensitivity 
of one diagnostic test (faecal screening for Sphaerularia bombi infection at 14-21 days post-
capture) detects 100% of infections (Vaughan-Higgins et al 2015), we know that this 
biosecurity method was successful.  At the pool frog reintroduction site a field quarantine 
barrier was established which attempted to reduce contact with destination hazards 
(ranaviruses and Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis).  These destination hazards (either 
infection or disease) have been absent from native amphibians and pool frogs at the 
reintroduction site, a sign that the quarantine barrier has apparently achieved its purpose.  
 
On the basis of our understanding of epidemiological principles, we would expect biosecurity, 
largely through quarantine barriers, as illustrated above, to protect translocated and recipient 
populations and we have presented evidence to support this.  For example an absence of 
mortality associated with high risk non-native parasites (cirl bunting, Fisher’s estuarine moth 
and short-haired bumblebee projects), a reduction in mortality associated with endemic 
parasites (cirl bunting project), the absence of high risk pathogenic parasites (destination 
hazards), or associated diseases, at the destination (pool frog project); no diseases in closely 
related species at the destination site (pool frog project). We know of no other studies which 
have evaluated the ability of biosecurity to prevent transfer of infectious agents between 
populations in wild animal translocation scenarios.  We recommend that simple biosecurity 
protocols are always set up for conservation translocations whatever the result of a disease 
risk analysis because severe disease outbreaks have occurred in association with previously 
unknown parasites, including the two mentioned above (squirrelpox and Bd-associated-
disease), and the risk of those parasites could not have been assessed pre-translocation, a 
consequence of our poor understanding of wild animal parasites. 
 
Biosecurity protocols may risk stress or injury to animals through close confinement and there 
is a monetary cost involved (Dickens et al., 2010, Ewen et al., 2012).  All the biosecurity 
methods we employed were relatively simple and practical to implement with minimal cost 
other than staff wages  Importantly, we did not change animal management methods through 
implementing biosecurity or quarantine:  the management methods would have been used in 
the same way in the absence of biosecurity.  We merely placed our quarantine barrier and / 
or biosecurity around existing management protocols; the measures did not increase the level 
or duration of confinement.  Therefore we not believe the biosecurity or quarantine methods 
had any influence on stress levels in the species translocated in these four cases.  The 
example noted above in which Bd was introduced to the Mallorcan midwife toad population 
illustrates the potentially disastrous consequences of not carrying out biosecurity, and 
supports its use, including quarantine, in all translocations.   
 
Yet, even when the identity of an infectious agent and the epidemiology of the disease is 
known, breakdowns in quarantine can occur.  This has recently been illustrated in the Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever outbreak in West Africa.  Despite considerable investment in barrier 
quarantine techniques, highly trained health professionals became infected and developed 
Ebola fever when there was contact with the external surface of quarantine suits (Chiappelli 
et al., 2015, WHO, 2014). Investment in biosecurity techniques for wild animal translocations 
has understandably not reached the level used in the control of fatal infectious human 
diseases.    Although the stringency of biosecurity will depend on the mode of transmission 
and pathogenicity of the disease agents of concern, the Ebola example suggests that training 
in biosecurity in wild animal translocation will be important to try to ensure it is sufficiently tight 
to prevent disease outbreaks, at least for highly contagious agents.  Breakdowns in 
quarantine, such as in the Ebola fever outbreak, imply that instruction of staff in implementing 
biosecurity for translocation programmes is crucial. We advocate further studies to evaluate 
the effectiveness of biosecurity to prevent transfer of infectious agents during conservation 
translocations to assess whether improvements in techniques are required.   
 
Currently, given the evidence available, we advocate the use of ‘best practice’ biosecurity 
protocols, communicated effectively through detailed workshops and written documents, and 
to improve on these techniques where evidence is available and costs allow. PRHS has a 
role to play in assessing the effectiveness of biosecurity through the detection of infectious 
agents which break the barrier and are introduced to destination sites and the results should 
be included in reviews of biosecurity protocols. Instruction in barrier techniques and 
communication between stakeholders including veterinarians, pathologists, parasitologists, 
animal care staff, ecologists and volunteers is advocated while evidence on their 
effectiveness is gathered.  It may be possible to develop risk-based approaches where the 
investment in barrier techniques is dependent on the results of a disease risk analysis, 
although in wild animal translocation for conservation the number of unknown parasites 
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